"Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. But it's not immediately clear what this view is meant to entail. It's not clear, for instance, what perception is supposed to contribute to the more advanced forms of knowledge that derive from it. Nor is it clear how we should understand the nature of its contribution--what it might mean to say that these more advanced forms of knowledge are "derived from" or "based on" what we perceive. Aristotle is often thought to have disappointingly little to say on these matters. Gasser-Wingate makes the case that this thought is mistaken: a coherent and philosophically attractive view of perceptual knowledge can be found in the various texts in which Aristotle discusses perception's role in animal life, the cognitive resources on which it does and does not depend, and the relation it bears to practical and theoretical modes of understanding. Aristotle's Empiricism offers a sustained examination of these discussions and their epistemological, psychological, and ethical implications. It defends an interpretation of Aristotle as a moderate sort of empiricist, who thinks we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledge by broadly perceptual means--and that we therefore share an important part of our cognitive lives with nonrational animals--but also holds that our intellectual powers allow us to surpass these animals in certain ways and thereby develop distinctively human forms of understanding"-- Provided by publisher

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Gasser-Wingate, Marc

IRL Press at Oxford University Press

Oxford University Press Academic US

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

OUP Premium

Oxford scholarship online, New York, NY, 2021

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

1, 20210405

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Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. But it's not immediately clear what this view is meant to entail. It's not clear, for instance, what perception is supposed to contribute to the more advanced forms of knowledge that derive from it. Nor is it clear how we should understand the nature of its contributionwhat it might mean to say that these more advanced forms of knowledge are "derived from" or "based on" what we perceive.Aristotle is often thought to have disappointingly little to say on these matters. Gasser-Wingate makes the case that this thought is mistaken: a coherent and philosophically attractive view of perceptual knowledge can be found in the various texts in which Aristotle discusses perception's role in animal life, the cognitive resources on which it does and does not depend, and the relation it bears to practical and theoretical modes of understanding.<em>Aristotle's Empiricism</em> offers a sustained examination of these discussions and their epistemological, psychological, and ethical implications. It defends an interpretation of Aristotle as a moderate sort of empiricist, who thinks we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledge by broadly perceptual meansand that we therefore share an important part of our cognitive lives with nonrational animalsbut also holds that our intellectual powers allow us to surpass these animals in certain ways and thereby develop distinctively human forms of understanding.

Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. But it’s not immediately clear what this view is meant to entail. For it’s not clear what perception is supposed to contribute to the more advanced forms of knowledge that derive from it, or indeed how we should understand the nature of its contribution—what it might mean to say that these more advanced forms of knowledge are “derived from” or “based on” what we perceive. Aristotle is often thought to have disappointingly little to say on these matters. I argue here that this thought is mistaken: a coherent and philosophically attractive view of perceptual knowledge can be found in the various texts in which Aristotle discusses perception’s role in animal life, the cognitive resources on which it does and does not depend, and the relation it bears to practical and theoretical modes of understanding. What emerges from these discussions is a moderate form of empiricism—an empiricism on which we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledge by broadly perceptual means, but nonetheless rely on our intellectual powers for more advanced forms of understanding. I consider the role this empiricism plays in Aristotle’s account of our learning, and its implications for his views about practical wisdom and the cognitive lives of nonrational animals.

Though Aristotle is often thought to be an empiricist-someone who thinks all knowledge is somehow derived from perception-the philosopher is often thought to have little to say on these matters. Gasser-Wingate here offers a sustained examination of these discussions and their epistemological, psychological, and ethical implications. It defends an interpretation of Aristotle as a moderate sort of empiricist, who thinks we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledgeby broadly perceptual means, and that we therefore share an important part of our cognitive lives with nonrational animals, but also holds that our intellectual powers allow us to surpass them in certain ways, and develop distinctively human forms of understanding

Though Aristotle is often thought to be an empiricist-someone who thinks all knowledge is somehow derived from perception-the philosopher is often thought to have little to say on these matters. Gasser-Wingate here offers a sustained examination of these discussions and their epistemological, psychological, and ethical implications. It defends an interpretation of Aristotle as a moderate sort of empiricist, who thinks we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledge by broadly perceptual means, and that we therefore share an important part of our cognitive lives with nonrational animals, but al

Though Aristotle is often thought to be an empiricist - someone who thinks all knowledge is somehow derived from perception - the philosopher is often thought to have little to say on these matters. Gasser-Wingate offers a sustained examination of these discussions and their epistemological, psychological, and ethical implications

2021-09-25